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Identifying Congressional Overrides Should Not Be
This Hard
Deborah A. Widiss
“It is hard to do empirical studies of statutory overrides, because it is very
hard to find them all.”1
—Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr.

I.

Introduction

Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Matthew R. Christiansen’s new
article analyzing more than forty years of Congressional overrides is a very
significant achievement.2 The article builds on Professor Eskridge’s
groundbreaking study, published in 1991, that demonstrated conclusively
that Congress monitors judicial activity and regularly responds to statutory

* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. First and foremost, I thank
Bill Eskridge and Matt Christiansen for conducting their study. It is a significant advance in our
understanding of overrides, and it is an honor to respond to it. I am also personally grateful that Bill
and Matt were willing to share their data with me, even prior to publication, to assist me with a
project of my own that explores the extent to which courts continue to rely on overridden
precedents. I also thank my coauthor on that project, Brian Broughman, for being my thought
partner in exploring these issues and for sharing his statistical and methodological expertise with
me, including assisting me with the data analysis that I did for this response. Additionally, I thank
Rick Hasen and Matt Christiansen for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Matt Pfaff provided
excellent research assistance. And finally, I thank the editorial staff of the Texas Law Review See
Also for inviting me to write this response and for helping finalize it for publication.
1. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1317, 1325 (2014).
2. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1.
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interpretation decisions.3 The new study, however, goes far beyond the 1991
study in the depth and scope of its analysis, and it should dramatically
reframe the way in which scholars approach the study of overrides. Indeed,
although the most publicized overrides are highly charged debates in which
Congress forcefully repudiates a judicial interpretation as misrepresenting
prior Congressional intent,4 Christiansen and Eskridge conclude such
“restorative” overrides are actually rather rare. By contrast, they find that the
majority of overrides “update” or “clarify” policy,5 often in response to a
specific plea from the Supreme Court to do so.6 They also deepen our
understanding of factors that are highly correlated with overrides, including
their provocative findings that cases that rely upon the whole act or whole
code canons of statutory interpretation are disproportionately likely to be
overridden7 and that women and minority groups now increasingly look to
Congress rather than the courts to enforce and expand principles of equality.8
They offer several sensible proposals to make overrides more effective,9
important insights about the central role that agencies play in both generating
and implementing overrides,10 and a nuanced exploration of the problems
that may result from a dramatic decrease in override activity in recent
years.11
All of this thoughtful analysis invites further exploration and debate.12
For purposes of this response, however, my comments focus on a
threshold—but crucially important—point: It is a major accomplishment
simply to compile a relatively comprehensive list of overrides. Christiansen
and Eskridge frame their new study in part as a response to the New York
Times’s declaration, based on a recent study by Professor Richard L. Hasen,
that overrides have “fallen to almost none.”13
They explain their
significantly different findings—Christiansen and Eskridge identify 122

3. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
4. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1374–75.
5. See id. at 1370–74.
6. See id. at 1409–13.
7. See id. at 1401–08.
8. See id. at 1381–82.
9. See id. at 1439–73.
10. See id. at 1375–80, 1450–58.
11. See id. at 1473–79.
12. I have already begun to plumb their data for a forthcoming project on ongoing reliance on
overridden precedents, and I am sure that many others will use their incredibly rich data set to
further deepen our understanding of overrides.
13. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1318 (quoting Adam Liptak, In Congress’s
Paralysis, A Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
08/21/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-power-from-paralysis-of-congress.html?_r=0);
see
also
Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress,
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013).
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overrides between 1991 and 2011, whereas Hasen identifies just 46 overrides
in the same time period—as the result of different methodologies employed
for identifying overrides.14 That said, as emphasized by the quotation that
opened this essay and a similar statement by Hasen, both research teams
agree that it is very difficult to identify overrides.15
In this essay, I argue the differing results of these two studies represent
more than simply two distinct methodologies for identifying overrides.
Rather, in fundamental ways, they speak to the efficacy of overrides. As
discussed more fully below, Hasen, using the methodology first pioneered by
Professor Eskridge in his 1991 study, identified overrides primarily by
looking for statements in Congressional committee reports that indicated an
intent to override a prior decision; in the new study, Christiansen and
Eskridge combine review of legislative history with a review of all court
decisions on Westlaw that flagged a prior precedent as having been affected
by subsequent statutory action. Thus, although Christiansen and Eskridge do
not characterize their research methods in this matter, they moved from a
methodology that focuses primarily on ex ante signals from Congress to one
that relies heavily on ex post analysis by courts. Below, I do original
analysis of Christiansen and Eskridge’s data and find that the data set of
overrides they identified differed from Hasen’s not only in number but also
in kind. In short, the Congress-centered methodology that Hasen employed
was far more effective at identifying overrides that Christiansen and Eskridge
classify as “restorative” and “deep” than it was at identifying updating or
clarifying overrides.16
Christiansen and Eskridge also observe that there was often a delay of
several years before courts first flagged a precedent as having been
superseded by statute, and that relying on court-based signals yielded high
numbers of false positives (that is, cases in which courts suggested a
precedent had been superseded or otherwise affected by a statutory
amendment but that Christiansen and Eskridge concluded were not
overrides).17 They mention these facts only in passing while showing how
they correct for them, but I argue that these findings are important in
themselves. Courts, ultimately, are the primary audience for overrides18—
and these findings suggest deep-set confusion over how to integrate overrides
into a judicial system that prioritizes adherence to precedent. Again, original

14. See discussion infra subpart II(A).
15. Hasen, supra note 13, at 259 (“Identifying congressional overrides is a challenge, as there is
no single repository of such information.”).
16. See discussion infra subpart II(B).
17. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1329 n.48, 1342–43.
18. See id. at 1358–59 (explaining that the Supreme Court and Congress do not communicate
directly but rather through “judicial decisions and congressional responses, both codifications and
overrides”).
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analysis of Christiansen and Eskridge’s data reveals important patterns:
courts generally flag restorative overrides far more quickly than they flag
updating or clarifying overrides, even though one would assume that they
would be more likely to resist restorative overrides than updating or
clarifying overrides.19 In other words, although political-science literature
has framed overrides primarily as part of an interbranch policy struggle,20
this finding suggests that slow implementation may often stem from
information failure rather than wilful resistance.21 To put it simply, overrides
cannot do their work if courts do not know that a prior decision has been
overridden.
Accordingly, I argue that an important first step in making overrides
more effective would be for Congress simply to state—clearly in statutory
text, as well as in any committee reports—that it is enacting an override.22
The data suggests this would particularly helpful in raising awareness of
updating and clarifying overrides. It would make it far easier for relevant
congressional offices, administrative agencies, future researchers, and legal
search engines such as Westlaw and Lexis to maintain and update a relatively
comprehensive list of overrides and thus help ensure that courts can promptly
integrate overrides into their analysis. Or, more generally, offices within
Congress or administrative agencies could take on the responsibility of
systematically identifying overrides and disseminating information about
them. These suggestions supplement the drafting proposals, largely designed
to make restorative overrides more effective, that Christiansen and Eskridge
put forward, which I also heartily endorse (indeed, some build explicitly on
proposals I have made in my own prior writing in this area).23 I end,
however, with a note of caution. Christiansen and Eskridge report that
women and minority groups have been surprisingly successful at obtaining
overrides of narrow interpretations of civil rights laws, a phenomenon that
they dub an “inversion of Carolene Products.”24 This is an important insight,
but it also important to acknowledge a fact that Christiansen and Eskridge do
not highlight: courts retain the ultimate trump card in this particular dialogue,

19. See discussion infra subpart II(C).
20. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1458 (discussing political-science literature on
overrides); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 522–23 (2009)
(same).
21. See discussion infra subpart II(C), Part III.
22. See discussion infra subpart IV(A).
23. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1442–44 (citing Deborah A. Widiss,
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEXAS
L. REV. 859 (2012)); see also generally Widiss, supra note 20.
24. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1381 (referring to United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937)).
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in that they have often held that more expansive understandings of equality
that Congress seeks to implement are unconstitutional.25
II. Identifying the Overrides
A. Congressional-Focused Strategies Versus Judicial-Focused Strategies
Both Professor Hasen and Professor Eskridge and Mr. Christiansen
began with Eskridge’s foundational 1991 study, generally considered the
leading empirical study of overrides (prior to the publication of these two
new studies). In the 1991 study, Eskridge defined an override as anytime
Congress “reacts consciously to, and modifies a statutory interpretation
decision” such that similar cases in the future would be “decided
differently.”26 The 1991 study stated that, “[w]ith only a few exceptions,” it
did not include as overrides statutes for which the “legislative history—
mainly committee reports and hearings—d[id] not reveal a legislative focus
on judicial decisions.”27 In other words, it largely excluded “implicit”
overrides, in which a new statute may affect the viability of a prior statutory
interpretation precedent but Congress may not realize it is doing so.
To identify the overrides for the 1991 study, Eskridge and his research
assistants searched all committee reports printed in U.S.C.C.A.N. for the
relevant time period, noting every reference to judicial interpretations that the
reports described as being “‘overruled,’ ‘modified,’ or ‘clarified’ by a
provision in the proposed statute,” and then “weeding out” provisions that
were not enacted or that Eskridge determined did not override a decision in a
“substantial way.”28 Recognizing that (even then) not all laws generated
committee reports and not all committee reports are reported in
U.S.C.C.A.N., Eskridge also reviewed additional reports, hearing transcripts,
and secondary sources.29 This generated a list of 121 Supreme Court
decisions overridden by subsequent statutory provisions enacted between
1967 and 1990.30

25. See discussion infra subpart IV(B).
26. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 332 n.1 (emphasis added).
27. Id.; see also id. at 419 & n.308 (explaining that a “few” overrides were included even absent
legislative history on point where the “relevant communities of interpretation” “clearly linked” the
new statute to a Supreme Court case).
28. Id. at 418. For an argument that even statements in legislative history criticizing a prior
judicial interpretation should sometimes lead to reconsideration of settled precedent, see James J.
Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or
Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994), and James J. Brudney, Distrust and Clarify:
Appreciating Congressional Overrides, 90 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 205 (2012) (arguing that
courts should pay particular attention to legislative history accompanying overrides).
29. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 418.
30. See id. at 338. The 1991 Eskridge study also included 220 overridden lower court decisions.
Id. In the years after Eskridge’s pioneering study, various other researchers have employed his
methodology to update it and check it for completeness. See, e.g., JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?
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Hasen explicitly framed his new study as an updating of Eskridge’s 1991
study, and, to permit an “apples-to-apples comparison,” he used largely the
same methodology as Eskridge’s 1991 study.31 That is, he searched
committee reports on Westlaw, using the USCCAN-REP database, looking
for any reports or other materials that included words such as “overruled” or
“modified” close to a mention of the Supreme Court and, for a subset of the
years he studied, simply looking for any mention of the Supreme Court at
all.32 He recognized that committee reports appeared “less likely than twenty
years ago” to mention an override and accordingly supplemented this search
with secondary sources that identified additional overrides.33 Although he
did not require that the legislative history mention the override, he also did
not include any statutes that “implicitly overruled a Supreme Court statutory
interpretation decision.”34 In total, this generated a list of 46 Supreme Court
decisions that had been overridden since 1991,35 and it showed a significant
decline in override activity that began early in the 1990s and slowed to a
trickle in recent years.36
In their new study, Christiansen and Eskridge assert that Professor
Hasen’s data set was artificially deflated not (primarily) by the absence of
overrides but rather by the absence of references in legislative history to
overrides, an artifact of the decline in the use of legislative history more
generally.37 To address this potential shortcoming, they and their research
assistants engaged in an extraordinarily labor-intensive process to
supplement the results that the committee report search uncovered. First,
they identified every Supreme Court decision during the relevant time period.
Then, they used Westlaw to identify all cases in which a lower court
decision, or other legal document, flagged the case as having been affected
by a subsequent statutory enactment. They then followed up on all such
leads, reading the case and the later legislation to determine whether the
legislation met their criteria for an override.38

LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 77
(2004) (discussing how the author independently researched congressional reports and the
Congressional Record for a specific year and did not identify any overrides that had been included
in the 1991 Eskridge study); Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme
Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT THEATER: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN
THE 1990S, at 224, 225 n.1, 227 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson eds., 1998) (using
Eskridge’s framework but extending analysis through 1996).
31. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 217.
32. See id. app. IV at 259–61.
33. Id. app. IV at 259.
34. Id. The methodological index does not indicate what other markers of Congressional intent
were used to make this distinction.
35. See id. app. I at 252–55 (listing all overrides).
36. See id. at 218.
37. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1327–29.
38. See id. at 1328–29.
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In total, Christiansen and Eskridge compiled a list of 286 statutory
provisions overriding 275 Supreme Court decisions, including 122 since
1991.39 Notably, employing the Westlaw supplementary approach also
expanded the list of overrides of Supreme Court decisions for the earlier time
period that was the focus of the Eskridge 1991 study from 121 to 164
overrides.40 Thus, the bottom-line results of the Christiansen and Eskridge
study differed sharply from those of the Hasen study, especially for overrides
enacted during the 1990s. Whereas Hasen found a sharp decline in override
activity during that decade,41 Christiansen and Eskridge declared the 1990s
the “golden age of overrides.”42 Christiansen and Eskridge found overrides
began to drop off after 1999, although they did not find as complete a decline
as Hasen reported.43
Christiansen and Eskridge characterize their use of Westlaw primarily as
a mechanism to respond to the “diminished value of committee reports” since
1990.44 This seems to me to be a reasonable strategy, but it is important to
highlight the extent to which this shift is more than simply gap filling. By
moving from reliance on primarily committee reports, or other Congressional
materials such as hearing transcripts, to lower court flags, Christiansen and
Eskridge move from a Congressional-focused vehicle for identifying
overrides to a judicial-focused vehicle for identifying overrides (mediated, as
discussed below, through Westlaw’s coding conventions). In so doing, they
also move from an ex ante focus—that is, what was understood as the intent
prior to enacting the override—to an ex post focus—that is, how has the
override been interpreted.
Importantly, after using the Westlaw mechanism to identify overrides,
Christiansen and Eskridge reviewed the congressional hearings and
committee reports on each bill that included an override and found that in a
high percentage (approximately 85%) there was at least some explicit
mention of either the override provision or the problems with the Supreme
Court decision subsequently overridden.45 This suggests that at least some
congressional drafters were likely aware of the interaction between the bill
language and the prior precedent for many of the overrides. Nonetheless,
since hearing testimony is far less central to the legislative process than

39. Id. at 1329; see id. app. 1.
40. Id. at 1328–29, app. 1. They also removed a few statutes that had been classified as
overrides in the initial 1991 study after determining, upon further consideration, that they were not
overrides.
41. Hasen concluded that there was an overage of 5.8 overrides during 1991–2000, and that this
was heavily skewed by inclusion of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which (by his count) overrode 10
Supreme Court cases. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 209, 218.
42. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1336–40.
43. Id. at 1340–42.
44. Id. at 1328.
45. See id. at 1534, app. 3 (describing criteria). Analysis of data available upon request.
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committee reports,46 it is likely that these connections were less prominent—
and sometimes entirely ignored—in debate or discussion over bills in which
an override was mentioned in a hearing but not referenced in the committee
report or legislative language. And, notably, there were several bills in which
the overrides were not mentioned even in the hearings. Thus, in moving to
the Westlaw approach, Christiansen and Eskridge most likely lose at least to
some extent a distinction that the Eskridge 1991 study and Hasen both
emphasized, between statutory amendments in which Congress “consciously
intends” to enact an override and statutory amendments that might
“implicitly” supersede a prior decision.47
B. Classifying Overrides: Updating, Clarifying, and Restorative
Christiansen and Eskridge then further categorize the overrides into three
different “kinds” of overrides: updating, clarifying, and restorative.48
Although the political science literature, and many in the legal academy
(myself included), have focused on the interbranch struggles implicit in
Congress “challenging” the Court on contested policy matters through the
enactment of overrides, the picture of overrides that emerges from this new
study is much more nuanced. Christiansen and Eskridge conclude that
approximately two-thirds of overrides are “updating” overrides, in which
Congress did not express “negative judgment” about the Court’s
interpretation but merely replaced an older interpretation with a new rule that
is better suited for the modern regulatory state.49 Many of these overrides
were in some sense incidental to more general overhauls of a given statutory
scheme, such as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 or the Judicial

46. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside:
An Empirical Look Study of Legislative Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons, 95 STAN. L. REV.
901, 972–73, 977 (2013) (surveying congressional staff, finding that committee reports play the
central role in educating members and staff about proposed legislation and that reports are
considered far more reliable than hearing transcripts).
47. Of course, some judges and commentators would dispute the premise that Congress, a
collection of 535 independent legislators, can have a specific intent at all, but I agree with
commentators who argue that one can ascribe “group intent” to Congress. See LAWRENCE M.
SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 82–83 (2010) (noting
“we routinely attribute intent to a group of people based on the intent of a subset of that group,
provided that there is agreement in advance about what role the subgroup will play”); Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 864–65
(1992) (acknowledging that “ascribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex business,
and one that is often difficult to describe abstractly[,]” but arguing “that fact does not make such
ascriptions improper[,]” and explicitly endorsing ascribing group intent to Congress).
48. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1370–75. Hasen classifies overrides
differently into “technical”, “bipartisan”, and “partisan”, see Hasen, supra note 13, at 219, and finds
a particularly steep drop off for bipartisan overrides. Id. at 237–38. Hasen’s bipartisan category
seems likely to overlap with Christiansen and Eskridge’s updating and clarifying categories, which
they also concluded had fallen off sharply. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1368–69.
49. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1370.
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Improvements Act of 1990.50 They conclude that an additional group of
overrides, about 10% of the total, are “clarifying,” where the primary
justification was responding to confusion in the law.51
Accordingly, it is a relatively small subset of the total population of
overrides—approximately one-fifth—that Christiansen and Eskridge classify
as “restorative” overrides, where Congress repudiated the prior Court
interpretation as a flawed interpretation of the pre-existing law and
“restored” the status quo ante.52 These overrides disproportionately involved
civil rights and antidiscrimination statutes where partisan divides tend to run
deep,53 although even here, most of the overrides were at least somewhat
bipartisan and several were signed into law by conservative Republican
presidents.54 Notably, as Hasen highlights, this includes two relatively
recent overrides: the ADA Amendments Act, passed in 2008, and a
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, enacted in 2006.55 In other words,
well into the period of divided government, Congress could still put together
bipartisan majorities to override unduly restrictive interpretations of civil
rights legislation.
One potential limitation of this classification approach is that it takes
Congress’s word, primarily as expressed in committee reports, for the nature
of an override—when Congress may have political reasons for how it
characterizes an override that depart from the substantive reality of the
override.56 That said, the classification of overrides—and the striking finding

50. Id. at 1370–71.
51. Id. at 1373–74.
52. Id. at 1374.
53. Id. at 1375.
54. Id. at 1375.
55. Hasen, supra note 13, at 220. That said, Hasen also emphasizes that Congress was
deliberately ambiguous in the VRA’s override of a prior Supreme Court decision so that the bill
could garner a bipartisan majority. See id. at 221 (citing Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls
of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 218 (2007)).
56. For example, one of the court decisions that Congress responded to in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act—a massive bill that included at least 12 overrides—was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), a decision concerning the causation standard applied in employment discrimination
cases. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1353–54 n.155. Price Waterhouse was a
splintered decision, with a plurality opinion, two concurrences, and a dissent. The bill that became
the 1991 Civil Rights Act was referred jointly to the House Education and Labor Committee and the
House Judiciary Committee. The Education and Labor committee report titles its discussion of the
response to the case “The Need to Overturn Price Waterhouse,” emphasizes that the Supreme
Court’s decision departed from the interpretation adopted by numerous circuit courts, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Justice Department, and states that it “severely
undercut” the “effectiveness” of Title VII. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. I, at 45–46 (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583 (emphasis added). Christiansen and Eskridge thus (reasonably)
classify the override as “restorative.” See Christiansen and Eskridge, supra note 1, app. 1 at 1493.
Interestingly, however, the House Judiciary Committee report (discussing the same proposed
language, which is also very similar to the language ultimately adopted), while also critical of the
Supreme Court decision and noting that it departed from the interpretation adopted by several
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that a significant majority are updating or clarifying overrides rather than
restorative overrides—is a dramatic advance in our understanding of
overrides. Broadly speaking, the political science literature has framed
overrides as a check on the extent which the Court can implement its own
political objectives.57 Legal scholars, by contrast, have typically described
overrides as part of a “colloquy” between courts and legislators, in which
courts welcome “corrections” from Congress.58 The new taxonomy that
Christiansen and Eskridge develop in this article suggests that these
competing characterizations are probably both too broad-brush. It may be,
for example, that updating and clarifying overrides typically function as a
productive colloquy between courts and Congress, whereas restorative are
often a power struggle. Thus, one of the primary takeaways from this new
study is that empirical work on, and theoretical explorations of, overrides
needs to be sensitive to these nuances.
In fact, I did original analysis of Christiansen and Eskridge’s data,59
using their distinction between restorative and non-restorative overrides to

appellate courts, titled its discussion of the response to the case “Clarifying [the] Prohibition
Against Impermissible Consideration of Race, Color, Religion, Sex or National Origin in
Employment Practices,” and states that Section 5 “overturns one aspect of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Price Waterhouse.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. II, at 16 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 709 (emphasis added). In fact, there was significant debate more generally over
whether the 1991 Act would state that its purpose was “restoring” or that its purpose was
“expanding” civil rights protections; a word choice that was thought to be important for determining
whether the overrides would be applied retroactively. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511
U.S. 298, 307–08 (1994); Widiss, supra note 20, at 540–541. As far as the response to Price
Waterhouse went, although the substance of the override replaced an affirmative defense on liability
with a limitation on remedies, the practical effect of the override was in many respects identical to
the standard adopted by the plurality and Justice White’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse. See
Widiss, supra note 23, at 883, 885, 902–04 (discussing the override and prior judicial interpretations
in more detail). Indeed, in a recent Supreme Court decision, several of the justices emphasized the
extent to which the 1991 Act’s response “endorsed the [Price Waterhouse] plurality’s conclusion”
regarding what kind of claims were actionable and merely “supersed[ed] Price Waterhouse in part.”
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2539 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 185 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “Congress ratified Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of the plaintiff’s
burden of proof” in the 1991 Act) (emphasis added). My point here is not that there is anything
inherently incorrect in classifying the Price Waterhouse response as a restorative override—I would
do the same myself—but to emphasize the extent to which it also could plausibly be called a
clarifying override or even (in many respects at least) a codification. See also Christiansen &
Eskridge, supra note 1, app. 3 at 1535 (discussing how they coded the reasons for the override of
Price Waterhouse). The broader point is that these lines are fuzzy and subject to manipulation for
the sake of political or doctrinal arguments.
57. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1458 (noting that most of the major politicalscience models “assume the Supreme Court is primarily a strategic actor, seeking to impose its
political and institutional preferences onto statutes and avoiding overrides through crafty dodges”).
58. See id. at 1458–59 (describing the most popular legal model’s notion of Congress as the
“principal” and the Court as the “faithful agent” carrying out the directives that have been legally
enacted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Again, I am grateful to them for their willingness to share their data with me.
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look back at Hasen’s findings, and I discovered an interesting pattern. As
noted above, Hasen’s study included only 46 Supreme Court decisions
overridden since 1991 (including 5 that were not included in Christiansen
and Eskridge’s list),60 while the Christiansen and Eskridge study includes
122 for the same time period. Thus, on average, Hasen’s study included only
34% of the overrides included in Christiansen and Eskridge’s list. But these
differences were not evenly distributed. Hasen’s methodology identified a
far higher percentage of the overrides that Christensen and Eskridge
classified as restorative than the overrides they classified as updating or
clarifying. To be specific, looking only at the overlapping years, Hasen
included 73% of the overrides coded as restorative in the Christiansen and
Eskridge study, while only 17% of the non-restorative (that is, updating and
clarifying) overrides. A similar pattern appears when considering
Christiansen and Eskridge’s depth variable, a variable that is highly
correlated with restorative overrides.61 Hasen included 7% of the overrides
coded as depth “1” or “2”; 35% of the overrides coded as depth “3”; and 67%
of the overrides coded as depth “4”, where increasing numbers indicate
“deeper” overrides—that is, overrides that disapprove not only of a specific
result but also of the reasoning employed to reach that result.62
Hasen’s override database thus differed significantly from Christiansen
and Eskridge’s as to the kind of override included, as well as to the overall
number of overrides included. Accordingly, one possible conclusion is that
ex ante committee-report-focused research, as supplemented by secondary
sources, does a relatively good job of identifying “restorative” overrides and
“deep” overrides (which are themselves heavily overlapping categories),
whereas the ex post Westlaw-based research captures far more of the
interplay between large-scale reorganizations of statutory law and existing
precedents. This raises interesting questions that future researchers may wish
to explore: Does Congress even “know” the range of statutory precedents
that might be affected by significant restructurings of the statutory law? And
if it doesn’t, what effect, if any, should that fact have on subsequent
interpretation of an override?
C. False Positives, False Negatives, and Delay
Both Professor Hasen and Professor Eskridge and Mr. Christiansen
forthrightly admit that neither research methodology—that is, the legislative-

60. See, e.g., Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1353–54 n.155 (discussing Christiansen
and Eskridge’s rationale for excluding certain decisions that are included in Hasen’s study).
61. Analysis available upon request.
62. Analysis available upon request. I combined cases coded by Christiansen and Eskridge as
having a depth of “1” or “2” to create a reasonably-sized sample. I did not report results in the text
for overrides coded as “0” or “5” because there were only two of each. Hasen did not include any
of the depth “0” or “5” overrides.
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history-focused strategy or the judicial-citation-focused strategy—is
infallible.63 The legislative-history approach generates “false positives” in
the form of disapproving mentions of Supreme Court decisions in committee
reports for bills that are not actually enacted, and characterizations of bills as
disagreeing with a prior judicial interpretation, where further consideration of
the enacted language suggests a codification. And it generates “false
negatives,” in that it fails to identify some statutory amendments that are
clearly overrides. As Hasen observes, the committee-report method failed to
capture a law explicitly titled “The Reversal of Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett
Act.”64 More generally, as described above, Christiansen and Eskridge
concluded that the Westlaw identification system uncovered significantly
more overrides than the legislative-history-focused strategy.
But the Westlaw identification strategy was also very inaccurate.
Christiansen and Eskridge little discuss the import of these findings beyond
noting that they and their research assistants independently assessed the
statutory language and prior precedent to correct for them. My objective
here is not to question the accuracy of this process of sorting the wheat from
the chaff, but rather to highlight how the false positives, false negatives, and
delay they observed have important implications for assessing the efficacy of
overrides.
First, the Westlaw identification strategy generated a lot of false
positives. Christiansen and Eskridge identified every decision issued by the
Supreme Court during the relevant time period and followed up on any
Westlaw flags that indicated that the precedent had been affected by
subsequent legislation. But many of these leads did not pan out. In their
words, they found that “about half the time, they were not overrides.”65 This
means that courts are frequently flagging precedents as “superseded by
statute,” “abrogated by statute,” or “called into doubt by statute” that careful
review suggests did not qualify as overrides under the definition Christiansen
and Eskridge employed.66
In part, this may reflect the simple point that, as noted above, “override”
is in some sense a term of art. In some instances, courts—and researchers—
63. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 260 (asserting that his research methods revealed most major
overrides, but nonetheless undoubtedly missed some); see also Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note
1, at 1325 (asserting that they identified a more comprehensive list of statutory overrides than any
previous study, but that they “surely . . . missed a few”).
64. Hasen, supra note 13, app. IV at 260 n.3.
65. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1328.
66. In an email exchange with Christiansen, I asked how frequent these false positives were and
whether they were more frequent when the flag indicated “called into doubt by statute” rather than
stronger signals such as “superseded by statute” or “abrogated by statute.” He explained to me that
they had not kept records of all of the false positives. He thought, however, that there was a higher
percentage of false positives for the “called into doubt” flags but that there were “an awful lot” of
false positives for each of the Westlaw signals. E-mail from Matthew Christiansen, Yale Law
School, to author (Aug. 29, 2013, 11:06 EST) (on file with author).
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can legitimately disagree about whether an amendment is an override.67 It
may also reflect impreciseness in the coding protocol employed by Westlaw.
Coders need to translate a court’s description of the interaction between
precedent and statutes into a limited number of flags. This is a complex and
nuanced interplay and sometimes the Westlaw researchers may not properly
code the import of the court’s discussion. But most importantly, it likely
reflects some real confusion on the part of lower courts about how statutory
amendments interact with precedent.
The Westlaw identification system is also slow. Christiansen and
Eskridge report that, on average, it takes six years after an override is enacted
before the precedent it addresses is first flagged by a lower court as
potentially superseded, although the average delay for overrides enacted in
the 100th and later Congresses (that is, 1987 and later) decreased to just
under four years.68 Christiansen and Eskridge suggest, reasonably, that the
decreased lag time likely reflects the increased availability of electronic
search tools. If this is correct, it seems likely that the lag time will continue
to diminish as search tools become more refined and affordable. But it will
likely continue to take several years for some precedents to be flagged.
During the later time period (that is, 100th through 112th Congresses, 1987–
2012), they report that nearly three-quarters of the overrides—already
flagged on Westlaw—were identified within five years.69 But Christiansen
and Eskridge do not explicitly state the corollary, which I think is perhaps
more important: that more than 25% of the overrides ultimately identified
were not flagged by any lower court (or at least not identified in Westlaw as
flagged by any lower court) within the first five years after the override.
And finally, the Westlaw identification system is incomplete, or, to put it
in social science language, it also generates false negatives—that is, older
precedents that should be flagged as superseded but that appear, on Westlaw
at least, as fully binding precedent. For more recent Congresses, this may
simply reflect the time lag. Christiansen and Eskridge explain that for the
106th through 112th Congresses (1999–2012), about a third of the overrides
they identified through other research tools had not yet been flagged on
Westlaw, while only 10% of the overrides from the 100th through the 105th
(1987–1998) had not yet been flagged.70 But it is again important to
emphasize the flip of this observation: even fifteen years after an override has
been enacted, one out of ten decisions identified by Christiansen and
Eskridge as having been overridden have never been indicated as such by
lower courts. In total, Christiansen and Eskridge report that 56 out of the
total of 275 Supreme Court cases in their data set have not (yet) been flagged
67
68.
69.
70.

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 60.
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1343.
Id.
Id.
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by lower courts as superseded or otherwise affected by later statutory
enactments.71
These findings may actually understate the problem, in that the
Christiansen and Eskridge study focuses only on Supreme Court decisions
that have been overridden. It is not uncommon, however, for Congress to
supersede lower court decisions. In Professor Eskridge’s 1991 study, where
he sought to identify all Supreme Court and lower court decisions that had
been overridden from 1967 to 1990, roughly two thirds of his total data set
were lower court decisions.72 Subject-specific studies of overrides, such as a
study that sought to identify all bankruptcy decisions that had been
overridden, likewise identify numerous lower court decisions.73
It seems quite possible that lower courts would miss overrides of earlier
lower court decisions more frequently than they would miss overrides of
Supreme Court decisions, simply because Supreme Court decisions generally
receive more attention and because Congressional overrides of Supreme
Court decisions also probably receive more attention. If future research were
to confirm that this is the case, this would suggest that the delay and the
problem of “false negatives” is even greater than that suggested by
Christiansen and Eskridge’s current study—that is, that probably far more
than 10% of all overrides may never be flagged by lower courts as
overridden. Additionally, putting together these two observations—that the
committee-report identification process is incomplete and that the Westlaw
identification process is also incomplete—suggests that there are almost
certainly at least a few overrides that have been enacted that are not captured
through either mechanism (or the various supplementary mechanisms the
researchers employed).
Christiansen and Eskridge do not further disaggregate these findings, but
I was curious as to whether these lag times and the failure to flag at all varied
according to the “kind” of override enacted. Accordingly, I ran some
additional analysis using the data that Christiansen and Eskridge compiled.
Recall that Christiansen and Eskridge found that it took, on average, just
under four years for overrides enacted by the 100th or later Congress (1987
or later) to be flagged.74 Breaking down these results by type of override
shows striking differences.75 The lag time for most restorative overrides was
extraordinarily short. The mean lag time was 2.57 years, but the median lag

71. Id. at 1343 n.128.
72. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 338.
73. See Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53
VAND. L. REV. 887 (2000).
74. See supra text accompanying note 68.
75. Like Christiansen and Eskridge in their analysis of lag time, I excluded all overrides that
have not yet been flagged by lower courts, obviously skewing the time frame for “recognition”
shorter, since some have still not been recognized.
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time was only 0.32 years—in other words, 50% of restorative overrides are
flagged by a lower court on Westlaw in less than four months.76 The picture
looks dramatically different when considering the overrides that Christiansen
and Eskridge classify as non-restorative. For these updating or clarifying
overrides, the mean was 4.23 years and the median was 2.08 years, that is,
more than six times longer than the median for restorative. Moreover, a true
measure of the “lag time” for flagging non-restorative overrides would be
even longer—and the gap with restorative even greater—because a higher
percentage of the non-restorative overrides have not been flagged on
Westlaw at all, and thus were excluded entirely from the averages.77 This
suggests, as I discuss more fully below, that there are significant information
failures in implementing updating or clarifying overrides, or at least that
courts do not routinely flag their effect on prior precedents. This finding is
particularly striking because one would expect courts to be far less resistant
to implementing updating and clarifying overrides than to implementing
restorative overrides.
If Westlaw were only a mechanism to identify overrides in a “research”
sense, this combination of false positives, delay, and false negatives would
simply go to the accuracy of the data set. Some amount of play at the edges
is common in any quantitative study that analyzes developments in the real
world rather than the controlled world of a laboratory. But at a fundamental
level, the Westlaw identification system is itself a marker of the efficacy of
overrides. That is, one of Westlaw’s (and Lexis’s) primary services is that it
flags when subsequent developments affect the reliability of prior precedent.
The evidence above suggests that there are deep-rooted problems in the
reliability with which Westlaw (and likely Lexis) handle overrides, and/or
the reliability of the way lower courts handle overrides, problems that are
explored more fully below.
D. Westlaw and Lexis Coding Conventions Regarding Overrides
In developing my own study of overridden precedents, I sought to gain a
working understanding of how and when Westlaw’s Keycite service and
Lexis’s Shepard’s service flag precedents as having been overridden.78 In
many respects, the processes are broadly similar, although the “top-level”
signals typically employed by the two services to overrides differ
considerably, as discussed below.

76. Analysis available upon request.
77. Looking at overrides that occurred in 1987 or later, 93% of the restorative overrides have
been identified on Westlaw, but only 82% of the non-restorative overrides. Analysis available upon
request.
78. To gain this information, I corresponded via email and spoke with representatives of each
company. Copies of the emails and my notes from these conversations are available upon request.
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Both Westlaw and Lexis rely primarily on signals from courts to make
determinations about the reliability of prior precedent. Within a purely
caselaw-based system, this approach makes good sense. Lower courts
cannot overrule binding precedent by a higher court, so in most instances a
decision will remain binding until a court at the same level says that it is no
longer binding. This is an oversimplification, in that the Supreme Court, at
least, is often somewhat obscure about the extent to which it is overruling a
prior precedent.79 Nonetheless, lower courts generally may safely wait for
clear signals from higher courts before disregarding otherwise binding
precedent.
The interaction of statutes and case law is necessarily more complicated.
Of course, it is clear that as a formal matter, Congress has the power to
supersede prior judicial interpretation of statutes.80 Westlaw, however,
generally will not flag in any way that statutory language calls into question
the validity of a precedent until a lower court makes a statement to this effect
in an opinion. Any such indications by lower courts flip the “flag” on the
prior precedent to “yellow” rather than “red”. (These are the flags that
Christiansen and Eskridge used to identify potential overrides.) Given the
number of false-positives that Christiansen and Eskridge identified, this is a
reasonable decision by those who designed the Westlaw coding protocol. But
for a very significant number of cases, it incorrectly signals that a case is still
“good law” when in fact it has been overridden, at least in part. This problem
is particularly acute under the “Westlaw Classic” search mechanism that is
currently being phased out but that, until quite recently, was widely used.81
On the newer Westlaw Next system, the flag is “yellow” but it is also
accompanied by specific textual phrases indicating the nature of the warning
(e.g., “superseded by statute” as opposed to “distinguished by”). On
Westlaw Classic, by contrast, the flag is yellow and the textual signal is a
generic signal assigned to all yellow flags, the vast majority of which simply
signal that some later decision has distinguished the earlier decision: “Some
negative history but not overruled.”
Westlaw generally will “red” flag a Supreme Court case only when the
Supreme Court itself clearly indicates that Congress’s subsequent action
superseded the prior precedent. This is a significant bar. The Supreme Court
decides relatively few cases in any given year, so it may take many years

79. See generally, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010) (collecting examples of this phenomenon
and discussing its significance).
80. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 281, 283–94 (1989) (describing “strong” and “weak” conceptions of supremacy).
81. According to Thomson Reuters’s second quarter 2013 report, 80% of Westlaw revenue had
been converted to WestlawNext. Press Release, Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Reports
Second-Quarter 2013 Results (July 30, 2013), available at http://thomsonreuters.com/pressreleases/072013/thomson-reuters-reports-second-quarter-2013-results.
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before it decides a case in which it would naturally cite an overridden case.
But even when the Supreme Court does cite an overridden case, it frequently
does not indicate in any way that the precedent has been superseded.82 And
if this occurs, Westlaw will not change the color of the flag to red. The only
other way in which, pursuant to its coding protocol, Westlaw will assign a
“red” flag to the overridden case is if Congress clearly indicates in statutory
language that a new law superseded a prior judicial interpretation.83
Congress, however, rarely does this—although, as discussed below, it
should.
The effects of Westlaw’s cautious approach to “red” flagging overridden
precedents are quite dramatic. As noted above, most of the cases
Christiansen and Eskridge identified as having been overridden are
eventually flagged by some lower court as potentially superseded. But very
few have actually been “red flagged” by Westlaw. In my independent
analysis of a subset of the Christiansen/Eskridge data containing overrides
between 1985 and 2011,84 I found that only 33 out of 166, or 20%, currently
have “red” flags on Westlaw. On Lexis, by contrast, 79% bear Lexis’s “red
circle” warning signal, because Lexis generally changes the signal as soon as
a lower court indicates that a prior precedent has been superseded. This,
however, may cause the opposite problem of overstating the effects of some
82. For example, Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)—a case that relied on plain-meaning
and whole-text analysis to disregard a long-standing agency interpretation—was overridden just two
years after it was decided (almost twenty years ago now). See Act of Sept. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2927 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501). Nonetheless, as of March 13, 2014,
the Supreme Court has cited Brown sixteen times without ever indicating that it was overridden, and
accordingly Brown is still “yellow-flagged” on Westlaw. The Court has never cited the case for the
specific substantive interpretation that was overridden, but it often cites Brown for statutory
interpretation principles where the fact that the case was subsequently overridden is arguably
relevant to the validity or persuasiveness of the interpretive principle. See, e.g., Mohamad v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (2012) (quoting Brown for the proposition that “there is a
presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute, a presumption
surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence”); Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (quoting Brown for the
proposition that “Age [of an agency’s interpretation] is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a
statute”).
83. Westlaw is not consistent in applying red flags even when statutory language specifically
disapproves of a Supreme Court decision. For example, the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006 included among its findings a statement that “effectiveness of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 has been significantly weakened by the United States Supreme Court decisions
in Reno v. Bossier Parish II and Georgia v. Ashcroft, which have misconstrued Congress’ original
intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965,” and Section 5 of the 2006 Act overrode the
interpretation at issue in those cases by amending the relevant language (although in a rather
obscure manner). See Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 2(b)(6), 5, 120 Stat. 577, 578, 580–81 (2006)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1). But Westlaw (as of February 27, 2014) does not red flag
either case.
84. This data set contains all overrides included in the Christiansen and Eskridge data set that
occurred between 1985 and 2011, except for the few cases overridden in that window that were
decided before 1946 and a few overrides that addressed cases that had already been overridden.
This limitation excluded 12 overrides, out of a total of 178 overrides.
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subsequent statutory amendments, since Christiansen and Eskridge’s
research found a high level of “false positives”, that is, warnings by lower
courts that a given precedent had been superseded that Christiansen and
Eskridge ultimately found was not an override. The bottom line is that
neither Lexis’s nor Westlaw’s signals with respect to overrides are very
reliable.
III. After the Override
My own prior work in the area has focused on judicial interpretations of
overrides in the employment discrimination context, most of which were
restorative overrides (often implementing an interpretation that had been
urged by a passionate dissent in the Supreme Court decision). I have argued
that courts often interpret such overrides unduly narrowly,85 and improperly
refuse to reinterpret identical language in related statutes.86 Christiansen and
Eskridge agree that this is a recurring and important issue.87 That said,
Christiansen and Eskridge’s overall findings suggest that these problems may
not be generally representative of overrides (although, as discussed below,
these findings are quite different from those of the other relatively large scale
effort to explore empirically the effects of overrides). Although Christiansen
and Eskridge’s primary focus in their new study is the factors that tend to
correlate with overrides and the nature of the overrides themselves, they also
include two variables that track the effects of overrides: An assessment of
whether the override statute has been interpreted “normally” by lower courts,
or whether it has been interpreted unusually broadly or narrowly, and an
assessment of whether lower courts agree or disagree about the meaning of
an override.88
Given the problems that have spurred my prior work, I was struck by
Christiansen and Eskridge’s finding that about 75% of the overrides were
given what they deemed to be a “normal” interpretation.89 Those that were
not “normally” interpreted were split roughly 50/50 between interpretations
that Christiansen and Eskridge characterized as unduly narrow, or actually
invalidating the override, and those that they characterized as surprisingly
broad.90 They also found that courts quickly reached consensus on the
meaning of most overrides, with about two-thirds resulting in an
“immediate” consensus and 99% percent reaching a consensus within 10

85. See Widiss, supra note 20, at 567–80.
86. See Widiss, supra note 23, at 926–41.
87. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1443 & n.446 (citing to Widiss, supra note 20,
and Widiss, supra note 23).
88. See id. at 1434–36
89. Id. at 1435 fig. 34.
90. Id.

2014]

Response

163

years.91 Christiansen and Eskridge do not break these findings down by
“types” of overrides, but again, I independently assessed the data for
overrides since 1985 to see if there were differences between restorative and
non-restorative overrides. I found that there was not much variation, but that
the levels of judicial consensus were a little higher for restorative overrides
than for other overrides.92
These results merit further investigation, in part because they are
strikingly different from the results of a study of overrides conducted by
political scientist Jeb Barnes. Barnes looked at a data set of 100 randomly
selected overrides that was based largely on Eskridge’s 1991 study (and
accordingly included overrides of both Supreme Court and lower court
decisions). He found that there was a high level of judicial dissensus—
defined as either a circuit split or a significant intracircuit split—about the
rule established by the override in just under half of his total.93 And he found
that the levels of judicial dissensus varied dramatically by subject matter.94
There was almost total consensus about the rule established by tax
overrides.95 By contrast, there was dissensus in every civil rights override in
his database; more generally, he found that only one in ten cases concerning
minority rights, in any context, yielded consensus.96 His research also found
that contexts where there had been high levels of partisan divide in the
interpretation of a statute before an override tended to yield higher levels of
dissensus after the override.97
There are several possible explanations for the differences between
Barnes’s findings and Christiansen and Eskridge’s findings. The research
teams may have used different coding conventions regarding what constitutes
“dissenssus” or “consensus.”98 They also covered different time periods.99

91. Id. at 1435, 1436 fig. 35.
92. Specifically, of those for which there was sufficient information available to make a
judgment, 70% of the restorative overrides were coded as reaching immediate consensus, whereas
67% of the non-restorative overrides were coded as reaching immediate consensus. There was also
little variation between categories when looking at the scope of the interpretation. Analysis on file
with author.
93. BARNES, supra note 30, at 90.
94. See id. at 169–71.
95. See id. at 169.
96. Id. at 171.
97. Id. at 169–70.
98. Barnes’s analysis focused on whether there were circuit splits or significant intracircuit
dissensus in the years shortly after the override, and also looked at the extent to which later
decisions were applied consistently by judicial appointees from both parties. Id. at 79–98. He used
a seven-to-ten-year time horizon that seems roughly consistent with that employed by Eskridge and
Christiansen. Id. at 78.
99. A quick review of the data suggests that the different time periods covered is unlikely to be
the explanatory factor. Looking at overrides enacted after 1991 shows about 70% of those for
which there was sufficient information to make a judgment were coded as reached consensus
quickly, which is roughly consistent with Christiansen and Eskridge’s findings for the full data set.
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And one data set included lower court cases, while the other was made up
entirely of Supreme Court cases. But a key difference may also be the
process through which Christiansen and Eskridge identified lower court cases
to assess the level of consensus and whether the override language is “fairly”
interpreted. They generated the cases for review by using Westlaw’s “citing
reference” function to identify cases that cited the override statutes.100 This
approach thus necessarily focuses only on cases where courts have flagged
the override as potentially relevant to the matter and then gone on to interpret
it. This method will not catch any cases in which the override arguably could
be deemed relate to the case at hand but is not. The time lags discussed
above demonstrate that for many overrides, there are considerable delays in
linking together an override and the precedent that it addresses. Looking at
the other side of the coin—that is, citation patterns of overridden cases—my
coauthor and I find that often there is very little change after an override.
This suggests that in a significant number of instances, courts may continue
to cite the overridden precedent without citing, let alone interpreting, the
override statute at all.101
IV. Making It Easier
A. Identifying Overrides
Christiansen and Eskridge have done a remarkable amount of work to
compile their list of overrides. Professor Hasen, likewise, did a remarkable
amount of work to compile his list of overrides. But it should not be this
difficult. That is, the findings regarding false positives, false negatives, and
delay in the Westlaw identification process demonstrate that in some
instances lower courts may not even know about an override for several years
after an override occurs, and, in many instances, lower courts are not sure
how to integrate the statutory amendment into their otherwise precedentfocused analysis. Thus, in addition to the many suggestions that Christiansen
and Eskridge lay out for making overrides more effective (all of which seem
quite sensible to me), I add a simple one: Congress should state in statutory
language that it is intending to override a prior judicial decision.
Congress does this occasionally.102 But it is rare. Looking at the
overrides Christiansen and Eskridge identify that were enacted since 1985, I

100. E-mail from Matthew Christiansen, Yale Law School to author (Feb. 14, 2014, 14:12 EST)
(on file with author).
101. Brian Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of
Shadow Precedents (Feb. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
102. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 5
(“Congress finds . . . [t]he Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.
618 (2007), significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that
Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades[,] by
unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for
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found that less than 10% included the name of the case in legislative
language, and generally this was in restorative overrides where Congress was
especially vehement about wanting to express its disapproval of prior
Supreme Court decisions.103 This should change. When Congress knows it
is responding to a prior judicial decision, it should indicate its intent in
statutory text, as well as in any committee reports for the statute. These are
precisely the kind of statements that were typically found in legislative
history a generation ago, the disappearance of which posed such challenges
for the more recent research teams.104 Such statements could also indicate
whether Congress seeks to supersede a prior decision completely or only in
part.
This would have several benefits. First, it would clarify Congressional
intent in a form that fully satisfies bicameral and presentment requirements.
Second, pursuant to Westlaw protocol, it should result in the overridden
precedent being immediately red flagged, thereby presumably helping
decrease the considerable lag time that otherwise often occurs before lower
courts start to consider the interaction of the precedent with the override.105
And finally, it would make it relatively easy for the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), the Legislative Counsel’s office, administrative agencies, or
other enterprising researchers to regularly compile and disseminate a list of
all (identified) overrides.
Of course, this might invite a different problem. As indicated above,
looking at ex ante indicators to determine Congressional intent to override
suggests that sometimes Congress may be unaware of precisely which prior
precedents are affected by subsequent statutes, particularly when Congress is
discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.”);
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (“Congress finds . . .
the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its
companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA,
thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”); Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (“The Congress finds
that, as result of the decision of the Supreme Court in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio
v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 256 (1989), legislative action is necessary to restore the original congressional
intent in passing and amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.”)
103. See Broughman & Widiss, supra note 101.
104. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1328; Hasen, supra note 13, app. IV at 259.
Moreover, Congress could also include, again ideally in statutory language, more general statements
regarding the proposed intent of its override, such as an expectation that the overridden precedent
would no longer be relied upon in general or applied to other statutes. Christiansen & Eskridge,
supra note 1, at 1444–45; Widiss, supra note 20, at 562–63; see also Widiss, supra note 23, 920–25
(discussing proposed override bill that would have applied to “any Federal law forbidding
employment discrimination” and “any law forbidding . . . retaliation”, an approach which was
reasonable in light of recent Supreme Court decisions refusing to apply overrides to statutes with
similar language but which would cause a host of new interpretative problems).
105. In fact, Westlaw is not totally consistent in red-flagging cases even when the statutory
language clearly indicates disapproval with a prior decision and the substantive provisions override
the interpretation in that decision. See supra note 83.
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enacting a wholesale restructuring of a given area of statutory law.
Christiansen and Eskridge have already suggested that the CRS or the
Legislative Counsel’s office undertake research to determine when multiple
statutes might need to be amended to end reliance on an overridden decision.
This addresses a problem that I have called “the hydra problem,” in which
failure to amend all statutes containing similar language is interpreted as
acquiescence to ongoing application of an overridden precedent or other
disfavored interpretation.106 (In principle, I agree with Christiansen and
Eskridge’s suggestion, but, as I have discussed elsewhere, in practice, it
would often be difficult to correctly identify the full universe of potentially
affected statutes and politically unworkable to open up multiple statutes to
revision.107) I would add to their suggestions that CRS or Legislative
Counsel, or perhaps executive branch offices, should also take on
responsibility for systematically assessing when new statutory language
would modify existing precedents. They could flag this fact for bill drafters
so that they could explicitly address such precedents in the bill language, or
so that agencies could disseminate information about an override.
However, even if one of these offices were to endeavor to identify
overrides regularly, it would be extremely difficult to develop a
comprehensive list. Accordingly, it would be imperative that where a fair
reading of new statutory language impacts prior precedent, a failure on
Congress’s part to explicitly state its intention to do so in statutory text would
not be interpreted as grounds for narrowly interpreting the import of the new
statutory language to leave a prior precedent in place. Christiansen and
Eskridge argue for reduced reliance on the meaningful variation, whole act,
and whole code canons of interpretation generally, noting that cases that rely
on these canons are disproportionately likely to be overridden108 and do not
accord with the realities of the legislative process.109 At the very least, given
the challenges in identifying all precedents that are affected by an override,
the fact that in certain statutes Congress explicitly mentions an intent to
override should not be read to infer lack of a comparable intention in other
contexts.
B. Applying Restorative Overrides
The interventions discussed above would help ensure that courts know
overrides have occurred and provide guidance to courts on Congress’s intent
in enacting them. But it might not address a deeper set of issues that arises

106. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1445–47; Widiss, supra note 23, at 887–81.
107. See Widiss, supra note 20, at 563–64; Widiss, supra note 23, at 920–26.
108. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1401–08.
109. Id. at 1406 (citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 934–35 (2013)).
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with interpreting restorative overrides. The data reviewed above suggest that
restorative overrides are quickly red flagged, but, in at least some cases, they
are unreasonably narrowly interpreted. In prior work, I have suggested that in
many instances, this could stem from “good faith” confusion on the part of
judges, particularly lower court judges, about the extent to which a
subsequent statutory amendment supersedes otherwise binding precedent.110
I have also posited that, at least in some cases, it could also reflect judges’
efforts to implement their own policy preferences, and that they use the
interpretive complexities posed by overrides as a fig leaf to justify this
practice.111 Christiansen and Eskridge agree that these problems are
recurring, largely endorsing the concerns I have explored and proposing
several concrete steps that Congress could take in drafting override that
might minimize them.112 They also suggest that Congress might choose to
delegate more interpretative functions to agencies generally, and specifically
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is charged with
enforcing the primary civil rights laws that govern employment.113
These proposals are helpful, and I hope Congressional drafters will heed
them. But it is also important that Christiansen and Eskridge’s provocative
assertion that their study of overrides suggests an “inversion of Carolene
Products”114 should not be read to alleviate larger concerns regarding the
restrictive way in which the Supreme Court frequently interprets civil rights
statutes. That is, Christiansen and Eskridge highlight the extent to which
minority groups and women have been “winners” at obtaining overrides.
The corollary of this statement, however, is equally important: Courts have
repeatedly interpreted civil rights statutes narrowly enough to trigger efforts
to enact overrides. Moreover, at least if later Congresses are to be believed,
such interpretations have repeatedly been contrary to the intent of the original
enacting Congress.115 To make it worse, the Court has often then interpreted
the override itself narrowly, requiring Congress to enact yet another
override.116 Obviously, this requires additional political muscle and drains
Congressional and advocates’ resources that could be focused elsewhere.
And, while it is true that advocacy groups have successfully lobbied to have
110. See Widiss, supra note 20, at 523.
111. See id.
112. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1442–48.
113. Id. at 1448–-49.
114. Id. at 1381.
115. See supra note 102.
116. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 20, at 542–46 (discussing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), in which the Court adopted a very narrow interpretation of a
previous override). Ledbetter was subsequently overridden by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 794a, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e5,-16); Widiss, supra note 23, at 879 & n.98 (discussing a series of overrides and narrow
interpretations of such overrides leading to more overrides related to fee-shifting provisions in civil
rights statutes).
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some of these decisions overridden, many other constraining interpretations
remain on the books.117
There is a deeper issue here. Since these statutes often implicate core
principles of equality and the interaction of the state and federal government,
courts retain the ultimate trump card in this back-and-forth: The possibility of
declaring Congress’s more expansive understanding of equality, and the
necessary steps to achieve equality, to be unconstitutional. For example, the
Court recently held that a key provision the Voting Rights Act
reauthorization—which included two overrides118—to be unconstitutional.119
It may also soon hold that disparate impact liability in employment
discrimination law—also the subject of an important override120—is
unconstitutional.121 More generally, the Court has proven quite hostile to
efforts by Congress or state and local governments to implement substantive
understandings of equality, striking down, for example, affirmative action
plans in government employment or contracting122 and in education,123 as
well as efforts by school districts to use race as a factor in assigning students
to schools to facilitate integration efforts.124
One response is to deem this wholly appropriate. It is the Court’s job to
protect Constitutional guarantees of individual rights against potential
incursion by a majority insufficiently responsive to minority interests. But
this easy answer ignores a deeper truth implicit in Christiansen and
Eskridge’s findings—these statutes and government programs are being
struck down in “reverse discrimination” claims brought by white litigants
challenging what they contend is unjustified discrimination against them.
And the Court refuses to defer to the legislative or governmental interests put
forward in support of the law or policy because the Court is applying

117. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 23, at 920–26 (discussing unsuccessful efforts to override
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), in which the Court, in a 5–4 decision, adopted
a very narrow interpretation of a previous override). The Court subsequently relied on Gross, again
in a 5–4 decision, to further curtail the significance of the prior override. See Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2520 (2013).
118. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 221–22 (discussing the overrides in the VRA).
119. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act unconstitutional).
120. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B)) (overriding Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989)).
121. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (warning of a
coming “war” challenging the constitutionality of disparate impact doctrine).
122. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); .
123. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). The Court did permit a more limited use of
race as a factor to achieve educational diversity—see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)—
but has recently signaled such policies must be very carefully scrutinized. See Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
124. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,125 a heightened
scrutiny that was initially premised on the assumption that minority groups
lack sufficient power in the democratic process.126 If the concerns articulated
in Carolene Products have in fact been inverted, it may be time to reconsider
the way in which the heightened scrutiny to which it gave birth is exercised
to undermine legislative efforts to implement expansive understandings of
what equality can, or should, mean.
V. Conclusion
Overrides are presumed to play an extremely important role in protecting
Congress’s authority to shape the meaning of legislation. But despite their
centrality in theories of the separation of powers, we have known relatively
little about when and how they occur—or even that they occur. Professor
Eskridge’s 1991 study was enormously influential not only because of its
own findings, but also because simply compiling a relatively comprehensive
list of overrides made it possible for other researchers to further explore the
subject. The new study likewise provides many important—and some quite
surprising—conclusions about the nature of overrides and the factors that
tend to predict overrides, as well as a treasure trove of new data for future
explorations. But I hope that we will not need to wait twenty years for the
next comprehensive list of overrides. Overrides do not just matter to political
science and legal scholarship; they matter to courts and to all of the
individuals, businesses, and government agencies whose actions are
regulated by statutory law. Congress needs to flag more clearly in statutory
language when it overrides a judicial decision so that courts can promptly
and accurately integrate these statutory amendments into their analysis.
Identifying overrides should not be this hard.

125. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720, 733–35; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270, 275; City of
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 494, 508 (each explaining that all racial classifications receive strict scrutiny
and holding that each challenged policy failed to survive such scrutiny).
126. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). But cf. Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the interests of white working class men are inadequately protected in Congress because of the
strength of organized groups asserting the interests of specific minority constituencies).

